



MUNES

'26

STUDY GUIDE

**HJCC
(SOVIET)**

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SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR (SOVIET)

1. Letter from the Secretariat

Dear Delegates,

As Eskişehir's first and only official MUN, it gives me great pleasure to welcome you to MUNES'26, a historic Model UN Conference. This conference is a special opportunity to promote cooperation, critical thinking, and diplomacy among young people in our city and beyond. In order to ensure that every aspect of this conference reflects excellence, dedication, and a commitment to providing a truly transformative experience, the Academy has brought together the most gifted students from all management teams of local MUNs. The Eskişehir Municipality and Governorship, along with the prestigious companies that have supported this event, are proud to support MUNES'26. Their contributions and trust demonstrate the importance of MUNES as a catalyst for civic engagement, youth leadership, and the advancement of global awareness in Eskişehir. We really care about setting the rules for talking working together and cooperating with other countries as the only Model United Nations that represents our city. We are the Model United Nations for our city and we want to make sure we do a good job of discussing things and working with other people from different countries. We think it is very important to have discussions, diplomacy and international collaboration as the Model United Nations, for our city. This conference is an opportunity for you to think like world leaders. You get to discuss problems that affect the whole world and come up with new ideas to solve them. As a delegate you are representing the country you were assigned to. You also need to show that you can work well with others respect each other and understand points of view which is what the United Nations is all about. I want each of you to take part fully in your committees. Listen to what other people have to say even if you do not agree with them.. When things get tough be brave and curious and try to find a way to make it work. The United Nations is, about people working together so let us make that happen at this conference. I want to wish every delegate the best of luck during their sessions on behalf of the organizing team. I hope your discussions are enlightening, your partnerships fruitful, and your MUNES'26 experiences motivating. Let this conference be a journey of self-improvement, deep connections, and a long-term dedication to changing the world and your communities for the better.

Best regards,

Çağlar Baran Topaç - Secretary General

2. Letter from the Crisis Team

Dear Delegates,

As a Crisis Committee, this simulation will be fast-paced and highly dynamic. Events will unfold in real time, and your directives will directly shape the trajectory of the war and its aftermath. Expect military developments, intelligence leaks, political instability, regional interference, and humanitarian crises. Delegates must balance short-term tactical gains with long-term strategic consequences.

Best of luck :) ~~don't make any mistakes or we will eat your directives:~~

3. Letter from the Chairboard

3.1. Letter from the USG

Distinguished Delegates,

It is with great joy and excitement that I welcome you to MUNES'26. I am Efe Enes Kılıç, and I am honored to be serving as your Under-Secretary-General for this conference. Whether you are attending a crisis committee for the first time or you are an experienced delegate, I want you to feel at home here. Crisis committees are unlike any other committee experience; they are fast, unpredictable, and will push you to think on your feet. New situations will arise when you least expect them, and it will be up to you to adapt and find solutions under pressure. It won't always be easy, but I promise it will be worth it. A conference like this takes a lot of hard work and dedication to put together. I want to sincerely thank our entire Secretariat team for everything they have done to make this happen. I also want to thank our chairs and crisis staff who will be working hard behind the scenes to challenge you and guide you throughout the committee. To our delegates, be bold, stay sharp, and don't panic when a crisis hits. Think clearly, work together, and trust yourself. These next few days will test you in the best way possible, and I am confident that each and every one of you will rise to the occasion. I can't wait to see how you handle what's coming.

Welcome to MUNES'26.

Efe Enes Kılıç Under-Secretary-General / HJCC

3.2. Letter from the Cabinet Chair

Distinguished Delegates,

It is with great pride and honor that I welcome you to the Historical Joint Crisis Committee at MUNES'26. I am Doruk Özçelik, and I will be your one and only Chair for three days. For those who are facing a crisis committee for the first time, please feel free to ask questions anytime.

Since our committee is a Historical Joint Crisis Committee, we will face different situations compared to history, and this will challenge you. Time updates, new crises will measure your ability to adapt. These are very tough things for first timers, but I am sure you will manage to solve these problems, and don't forget you can always ask questions or anything that you are considering.

Lastly, I would like to express my gratitude to the Secretariat for giving me this opportunity. See you on the committee.

Doruk Özçelik - HJCC / Soviet Cabinet Chair

4. Introduction

The rivalry between the US and the USSR dominated the international system in the decades that followed the end of World War II. The Cold War was a period of global struggles for influence, ideology, and strategic superiority rather than a direct conflict between the two superpowers. Both powers backed their allies, funded proxy forces, and intervened militarily and politically in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East to sway the post-World War II international order in their favor. However, Afghanistan became a new and unstable arena in this rivalry in the late 1970s. Afghanistan was a region of incalculable geopolitical significance, situated at the meeting point of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia. As a border nation to the Soviet Union's southern republics, it provided a buffer against instability and Western encroachment. It was an opportunity for the US to prevent Soviet expansion and stop communism from spreading throughout the area.

4.1. Historical Background

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) officially split into two rival groups in 1967: Babrak Karmal's Parcham and Nur Muhammad Taraki's Khalq. Strong ideological and personal animosities persisted despite the factions' brief reunion prior to the Saur Revolution in April 1978. Following the 1978 Saur Revolution, the PDPA seized power and implemented radical socialist reforms, including the redistribution of land, policies promoting secularization, the expansion of women's rights, and initiatives to weaken the influence of religion and tribes. The conservative, tribal, and rural social fabric of Afghanistan was largely ignored as these reforms were implemented quickly and frequently under duress. As a result, there were widespread disruptions in the countryside, including Islamist resistance, rural insurgencies, and tribal uprisings. At the same time, internal factional divisions within the PDPA started to occur once more. Even if it meant widespread repression, the Khalq faction, which controlled Taraki's early revolutionary government, fought for swift and unreserved revolutionary change. In contrast, the Parcham faction favored a more gradual and politically calibrated approach to change, emphasizing institutional strengthening and alliance building over an immediate revolution. With the death of a prominent PDPA member, Mir Akbar Khyber, and the persecution of PDPA by Daoud's government and rival groups. Khyber's unknown death sparked anti-Daoud demonstrations in Kabul, which led to the arrest of multiple PDPA members and popular PDPA leaders. On the morning of April 27, 1978,

Daoud and his family were overthrown and put to death by the Afghan Army, who had strong sympathies for the PDPA. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) was established as a result of these events. The Soviet Union and the newly formed Afghan State signed a Friendship Pact on December 5th of that year.

4.2. Operation Storm 333 and the installment of a Puppet Regime

After the Khalq faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) consolidated its power, Hafizullah Amin's leadership was forced to rely on Soviet assistance to maintain control over the worsening domestic situation. In December 1978, the Soviet Union and the Afghan revolutionary government had already signed an agreement formalizing economic assistance and military cooperation. Theoretically, these accords were meant to strengthen the Afghan state's socialist transition. But in actuality, they marked the beginning of the Soviet Union's larger engagement in Afghan politics. Amin repeatedly demanded the arrival of Soviet troops during the spring and summer of 1979. Officially, these troops were to safeguard vital infrastructure, train Afghan military forces, and help quell the rising insurgency led by Islamist and tribal militants commonly known as the mujahideen. However, the reality on the ground indicated that the situation was not merely a military crisis. The revolutionary policies of the Khalq-led government, including land redistribution, the elimination of religious leaders, and the swift pace of political purges, had alienated significant numbers of the Afghan people. Instead of solidifying their power base, the government's policies fueled rebellion in the countryside and even within the ranks of the military. The initial hesitations of the Moscow government to intervene directly in Afghanistan was a reflection of their concerns that troops on the ground might turn a friendly socialist neighbor into a potential geopolitical problem. The concerns were supported by reports from the KGB station in Kabul. The intelligence agents had indicated that the leadership style of Amin was extremely repressive and unpredictable. His consolidation of power had already begun with the overthrow and execution of his former ally, Nur Muhammad Taraki, which came as a shock to many in the Moscow government who had previously considered Taraki a reliable ideological ally. After his consolidation of power, Amin began a series of purges aimed at removing his enemies and those who were considered to be disloyal to his regime within the party, the military, and the state apparatus. Although purges were not unusual in revolutionary regimes, what was disturbing to Soviet leaders was the scope and character of these measures. A number of people who were removed from power had strong connections with Soviet advisors or had been trained in Soviet institutions. At the same time, Soviet experts began to wonder if Amin might be considering other options for diplomatic engagement that were outside the reach of Soviet influence. Rumors began to circulate that Amin was trying to initiate communication with the United States and with the government of Pakistan, both of which had important strategic interests in the future of Afghanistan's government. Even the mere possibility of communication with these countries caused consternation within the Soviet leadership, which regarded Afghanistan as a vital buffer zone between Soviet territory and the southern border of the Soviet Union during the Cold War era. Of particular concern to the Soviet leadership was the relationship between

Amin and American diplomatic representatives in Kabul. Among these was J. Bruce Amstutz, who was the U.S. Chief of Mission at the time. While the meetings between Amin and American representatives were seen in Moscow as more than just normal diplomatic engagement, they could also be taken as a possible indication that Amin was trying to play off the superpowers or even change the alignment of Afghanistan. Whether or not this was a valid concern is a matter of historical interpretation, but it certainly contributed to the Soviet perception of Amin as a strategic threat. However, by late 1979, the Soviet leadership was confronted with a tough decision. On the one hand, the instability in Afghanistan posed a threat to the survival of a socialist government on their immediate border, which would undermine Soviet credibility in the global Cold War struggle. On the other hand, it seemed that Amin himself was contributing to the instability rather than stabilizing it. His repressive internal policies, purges, and foreign policy intentions made many Soviet leaders believe that it would not be sufficient to merely support Amin's government. With the escalation of insurgent actions and the waning of government control in Afghanistan, the question of intervention in Afghanistan began to shift from whether to how in the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership began to question the ability of Hafizullah Amin to hold the country together and even considered replacing him with a more trustworthy ally in the Afghan capital of Kabul. Such a change in thinking contributed to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan later in 1979. Operation Storm-333 was the assault carried out by the Soviet special forces that led to the direct military intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan on 27 December 1979. Soviet commandos, paratroopers, and KGB agents conducted a coordinated attack on the Tajbeg Palace in Kabul to eliminate the Afghan leader Hafizullah Amin, who was deemed unreliable and responsible for destabilizing the country by the Soviet government. In the course of the attack, Amin was killed, and the key government and military installations in the capital were quickly seized by the Soviet forces. This was immediately followed by the installation of Babrak Karmal, a leader of the Parcham faction of the PDPA who had been in exile, as the head of the Afghan government, thus establishing a regime that was highly dependent on Soviet political and military support.

4.3. Direct Soviet Intervention into Afghan Lands

Following the deployment and initial operations of the 40th Army, the military presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan quickly escalated to a large-scale occupation and counter-insurgency effort. The 40th Army was assigned with the responsibility of securing the major population centers, safeguarding the newly installed government in the capital city of Kabul, and maintaining control over the strategic highways, airfields, and logistical routes that linked the Soviet supply lines from Central Asia into Afghanistan. The Soviet military also sought to rebuild the Afghan government forces. The Soviet military commanders thought that securing the cities and lines of communication would enable the Afghan government to regain control of the countryside. But the resistance spread rapidly in rural areas, tribal zones, and mountainous regions, where the insurgents could avoid direct engagement with the military and opt for guerrilla warfare. The mujahideen fighters launched ambushes on convoys, sabotage attacks on infrastructure, and hit-and-run attacks on Soviet and Afghan military installations, often melting into the local population or falling back into

areas where conventional warfare would be less effective. The mission of the 40th Army changed from a short-term stabilization mission to a long-term military campaign to weaken the insurgent groups. The Soviet military started large-scale search and destroy missions in the contested provinces, employing armored forces, airborne troops, and helicopter-borne assaults to attack suspected rebel-held areas. Airpower was extensively used, with regular bombing and close air support to weaken the insurgent supply lines and bases. However, the insurgent groups were quick to adjust to the new situation and spread their forces to continue attacking the Soviet-held areas. On the other hand, the Soviet military was also facing some serious logistical and political challenges. The Soviet military was finding it very difficult to maintain such a large expeditionary force so far away from the Soviet mainland, and it was also very difficult for them to coordinate their efforts with the Afghan military forces. Moreover, the conflict was also gaining international attention, and some foreign countries were supporting the insurgent groups opposing the Soviet-backed government. The war had escalated into a costly and grinding struggle in which the Soviet forces were in control of many cities and major roads, but were finding it difficult to establish control over the countryside. The 40th Army continued to be actively engaged in the war, with rotations of troops, reinforcement of garrisons, and efforts to contain the insurgency in various regions. Rather than the rapid stabilization that the Soviet leadership had anticipated, the intervention had escalated into a costly conflict that had significantly impacted the course of the war in Afghanistan.

5. Structure of the Committee

5.1. Soviet Afghan Command



The structure of the Soviet command in Afghanistan during the early years of the conflict was designed to integrate the control of politics, military activities, and intelligence direction under the control of the Soviet Union. The operational control of the military activities in Afghanistan was mainly conducted by the 40th Army, which was the primary Soviet military presence in the country, responsible for military operations, securing large cities, and coordinating with the Afghan government military. Strategic control, however, was conducted from Moscow by the Soviet Ministry of Defense and the leadership of the Communist Party, which meant that military commanders in Afghanistan were required to implement both military and political strategies. In addition to the 40th Army, the KGB and other Soviet security agencies were actively involved in intelligence, counterintelligence, and advising the Afghan government institutions to maintain their loyalty to the pro-Soviet government. Advisors from the Soviet Union were present in all levels of the Afghan military and political structures, assisting in planning military operations, training troops, and influencing decision-making.

5.2. Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan were playing a crucial role in supporting the government during the war, but they were under immense pressure and dependence on the Soviet Union throughout the conflict in Afghanistan. The Afghan Armed Forces included the army, air force, and internal security forces, and their primary task was to maintain control of the cities, provinces, and vital infrastructure of the country while fighting against the insurgents. The Afghan military was expected to assume an increasingly leading role in combat activities as the Soviet military secured the environment. In reality, the military was beset by issues such as low morale, desertions, divisions among officers along faction lines, and a lack of training. Due to these vulnerabilities, the Soviet military placed advisors in the Afghan military to assist in planning military operations, logistics, and intelligence gathering. The Afghan military carried out joint operations with Soviet forces, securing cities, protecting routes, and mounting attacks against regions under the control of insurgents. Eventually, the government came to depend on its military not only for defending the country but also for securing political control, making the Afghan military a vital component of the Soviet-supported regime despite being under constant threat from internal instability and resistance.

6. Key Historical Figures

6.1. Dmitry Ustinov

Dmitry Ustinov was a well-known Soviet military leader and politician, who is best remembered as the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union from 1976 until his death in 1984. As the Defense Minister and one of the key individuals involved in the military response in Afghanistan, Ustinov was a proponent of a strategy that emphasized the use of force projection, rapid deployment, and the rapid stabilization of the Afghan government during the initial phases of the intervention. The Soviet military employed heavily mechanized forces, armored columns, and air support, which were believed to be effective in securing key urban areas, routes, and facilities. The first operational planning was based on the assumption that the intervention would be short and decisive, enabling the Soviet troops to stabilize the political situation and build the Afghan government before a gradual withdrawal of Soviet troops. However, the realities on the ground soon proved these planning assumptions to be incorrect. Rather than a short intervention, the conflict turned into a long-term counter-guerrilla war against insurgents in difficult terrain. Despite these difficulties, the early years of the conflict were characterized by one of the most committed periods of Soviet military involvement under Ustinov's leadership, as the Soviet Union continued to invest considerable military resources in maintaining its position in Afghanistan.



6.2. Nikolai Ogarkov

Nikolai Ogarkov was a high-ranking military leader in the Soviet Union who held the position of Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. Ogarkov is recognized for his efforts in promoting modernization in the military, which included the use of modern technology, enhanced command and control structures, and joint operations of various military forces. Ogarkov's strategic vision was centered on preparing the Soviet military for modern and large-scale warfare, especially against an advanced adversary. In the conflict in Afghanistan, some of these concepts had an influence on the Soviet forces. Mechanized troops, airborne troops, and helicopter-supported assaults were employed to carry out coordinated offensives, seize crucial points, and support the Afghan government troops. The Soviet forces tried to employ organized operational planning, which included ground attacks and air reconnaissance. The nature of the conflict, however, presented several challenges. The terrain, the decentralized networks of the insurgents, and the use of guerrilla warfare by the mujahideen did not match the conventional strategies that the Soviet military had organized for large-scale warfare in Europe. Thus, the Soviet military commanders were forced to modify their strategies, which pointed to the limitations of traditional strategies in dealing with irregular warfare in Afghanistan.



6.3. Sergey Akhromeyev

Sergey Akhromeyev was a high-ranking military leader of the Soviet Union during the Cold War era and attained the position of Marshal of the Soviet Union and a prominent member of the General Staff leadership. Throughout his military career, he was actively engaged in strategic planning, defense coordination, and the formulation of operational policies within the Soviet military establishment. His role often consisted of ensuring that the plans formulated at the General Staff level were properly implemented by the commanders on the ground. In the conflict in Afghanistan, Akhromeyev was involved in efforts to enhance coordination between military planning, intelligence analysis, and implementation. He stressed the need for the integration of intelligence information into military planning, especially in attempts to deal with insurgent groups active in remote and mountainous areas. This included more effective use of reconnaissance, analysis of insurgent movements, and attempts to adjust Soviet military strategy to the realities of counter-guerrilla warfare. As the conflict unfolded, it became increasingly apparent that the reality on the ground was far more complex than the political leadership had initially




anticipated, and Akhromeyev, like many senior military leaders, was forced to confront the disparity between initial assumptions of a rapid stabilization of the conflict and the prolonged military reality.

6.4. Other Notable Leaders


1. Andrei Gromyko

Andrei Gromyko was one of the most prominent diplomats and politicians of the Soviet Union, who was instrumental in shaping the foreign policy of the USSR for many decades. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR for a long period, he was recognized internationally for his tough negotiation skills and his unswerving commitment to the strategic interests of the USSR during the Cold War era. Although he was known for his tough image in international diplomacy, Gromyko played a crucial role in maintaining the international relations of the USSR and the balance of power between the Eastern and Western blocs. During the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Gromyko had a significant diplomatic role in explaining and justifying the Soviet side to the international community. As Foreign Minister and a member of the Soviet leadership, he was involved in efforts to justify the intervention as a form of assistance requested by the Afghan government, rather than an act of aggression. However, he also made efforts to reduce the political fallout from the international criticism, sanctions, and pressure from Western countries. Through negotiations at the United Nations and in bilateral talks with foreign governments, Gromyko made efforts to justify Soviet actions and maintain the influence of the USSR in international relations during the conflict.



2. Vladimir Kryuchkov

Vladimir Kryuchkov played an important part in the latter history of the Soviet Union, and he is best known as the head of the KGB and his activities during the last years of the Soviet Union. While he is now famous for his role in the 1991 coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev, his earlier life had important elements related to intelligence activities during the war in Afghanistan. Kryuchkov's role in the Soviet intelligence apparatus involved activities related to the security and intelligence efforts that supported the military strategy in the conflict. During the Afghan war, activities of the KGB were centered on monitoring resistance groups, counter-intelligence, and ensuring the internal security of the Afghan government, which was allied with the Soviet Union. The intelligence networks were responsible for the collection of information on the leadership of insurgent groups, their



routes of receiving supplies, as well as external aid given to various mujahideen groups. In this context, there was also an attempt to analyze the differences between various insurgent groups and find ways of exploiting these differences to undermine resistance against the Soviet Union and the Afghan government. At the same time, the KGB was involved in ensuring the security of Soviet citizens, preventing infiltration, and monitoring political events in Afghanistan that could impact the stability of the allied government. In this context, Kryuchkov was linked to the intelligence aspect of the war, which was the less visible but equally important aspect of the war that was taking place alongside the conventional military effort.

3. Babrak Karmal

Babrak Karmal was an important Afghan political leader and one of the most influential pro-Soviet leaders in Afghanistan during the initial stages of the Soviet-Afghan War. A senior leader of the Parcham faction of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Karmal had long been a close political ally of the Soviet Union and was considered by the Soviets to be a more loyal and compliant leader than many of his rivals. After a spell of political exile, he was restored to power by the Soviets and appointed as the leader of the Afghan government at the start of the Soviet intervention. As the leader of the Soviet-supported government, Karmal's main priority was the consolidation of state power and the attempt to stabilize the country in the face of a rapidly escalating conflict. His government was actively collaborating with Soviet military and political advisors in order to restructure the government and rebuild the military in an attempt to regain control of strategic cities and regions. Karmal also tried to temper some of the more radical policies of the earlier revolution in order to present himself as a corrective leadership in a bid to restore party unity. His administration was still faced with many challenges. The majority of the people saw his administration as one that was highly reliant on Soviet military power.




4. Mohammad Najibullah

Mohammad Najibullah was a prominent Afghan politician and security leader who emerged as one of the most significant pro-Soviet leaders in Afghanistan during the latter stages of the conflict. Prior to becoming the president of Afghanistan, Najibullah was the chief of KHAD, which was the Afghan state intelligence agency that closely collaborated with Soviet advisors. As the chief of KHAD, Najibullah was primarily concerned with improving internal security and combating insurgent activities. In his role as a leader in the intelligence community, he was instrumental in ensuring that there was coordination between the Afghan government and the Soviet military and intelligence apparatuses, particularly in the identification of insurgent groups and tracking opposition movements. Najibullah was also instrumental in the efforts to consolidate power and ensure that government control was maintained in strategic areas of the country. As the war raged on and with the increasing political pressure, he became a key player in the efforts to ensure that the Soviet-supported government remained afloat through a combination of security and political initiatives.



5. Abdul Rashid Dostum

Abdul Rashid Dostum was one of the most prominent commanders of the Soviet-supported militia forces, especially active in the northern regions of Afghanistan during the war. He rose to prominence from a regional militia background and established a strong power base among the regional forces, becoming an important ally of the Soviet-supported government. Dostum was instrumental in securing key cities, airfields, and important routes for the Soviet-supported government, sometimes coordinating his militia activities with forces of the Soviet Union active in the region. By means of his extensive regional networks and well-organized militia structure, he was able to retain a rapid mobilization capability that ensured a quick response to insurgent activity on the part of pro-government forces. His forces played a crucial role in securing stability in the northern provinces, where control of transportation routes and military facilities was critical to the war effort as a whole. Dostum's pragmatic leadership qualities, his ability to retain the loyalty of his fighters, and his territorial power made him a major military force throughout the conflict.



6. Mohammad Aslam Watanjar

Mohammad Aslam Watanjar was an Afghan military officer and politician who played a significant role as a pro-government leader in the Soviet-Afghan War in Afghanistan. He initially rose to prominence as one of the military officers who took part in the Saur Revolution of 1978 and later occupied a number of high-ranking positions in the Afghan government and military related to defense and internal security. As a result of his military background and his support for the communist government in power, he played a major role in organizing military forces of the state during the conflict. During the time of Soviet intervention, Watanjar was actively working with advisors and commanders from the Soviet Union to improve the military structure in Afghanistan and coordinate joint attacks against insurgent forces. His role included assisting in the organization of government troops, ensuring control of key military forces, as well as participating in efforts to stabilize regions under government control. As a political and military leader, he symbolized the Afghan leadership that was involved in connecting the Soviet-supported government with the military requirements of the forces during the conflict.



7. Abdul Qadir Dagarwal

Abdul Qadir Dagarwal was an Afghan military officer and political leader who was instrumental in the early years of the communist government in Afghanistan. He was known for his role in the Saur Revolution of 1978, as he was one of the military officers who led the charge against the previous government and brought in the rule of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Due to his military experience and his political alignment with the new government, he became a prominent figure in the Afghan military during the early years of the country's alignment with the Soviet Union. After the consolidation of the communist government, Abdul Qadir took up senior roles that were connected to the defense and military leadership, and he contributed to the organization and restructuring of the Afghan military forces. His role included supporting the government's efforts to retain control over the strategic regions, develop the military, and coordinate with the Soviet advisors who were helping the Afghan government. Although the internal power struggles in the ruling party impacted many leaders of that era, Abdul Qadir was still linked to the group of military officers who assisted in the formation and early defense of the pro-Soviet government during one of the most pivotal eras in the modern history of Afghanistan.



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